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FOREWORD

Why Marc Galanter's "Haves" Article is One of the Most
Influential Pieces of Legal Scholarship Ever Written
Shauhin A. Talesh
A few of the adjectives that I use when describing Marc Galanter's article published in 1974, entitled Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, include seminal, blockbuster, canonical, game-changing,
extraordinary, pivotal, and noteworthy. But do not take my word for it. Consider
for a moment the article's place in the history of legal scholarship. In 1996, an
empirical study of the most-cited law review articles of all time revealed that
Galanter's article placed thirteenth (Shapiro 1996).1 The Social Science Citation
Index has named the article "a citation classic." Galanter's article was included
in the 2006 volume entitled "The Canon of American Legal Thought" (Kennedy
& Fisher 2006). Notably, the introduction to that volume considered the article's
place in the development of American legal thought in the 20th century. For the
article's 25th anniversary, the Law & Society Review published a symposium
volume of articles dedicated to highlighting extensions and elaborations of the
original article. In addition to being cited by numerous courts in the United
States, Galanter's article has been translated into Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Chinese,
French, and Portuguese, among other languages.
Aside from the. article's impact on scholarly and policy discourse, the article impacts the training and education of students interested in studying law.
Galanter's article is assigned in virtually every law and society or sociology of law
undergraduate and graduate course in the United States. The article is cited in
dozens of Civil Procedure casebooks that law professors use to teach first year
law students. As we reach the forty year anniversary of this article's publication,
I reach one uncontroverted conclusion: this article is one of the most influential
pieces of legal scholarship ever written.
In Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, Marc Galanter explained how "repeat
players," i.e., those persons and organizations that anticipate having repeat litigation and have resources to pursue long-term interests, shape the development of
law and engage in a litigation game quite differently than do "one-shotters," i.e.,
those persons and organizations that deal with the legal system infrequently. Moving beyond legal formalism, Galanter's article provides a typology that highlights
the various litigation configurations among one-shotters and repeat players: one' An updated version of this study revealed it is currently the 37th most-cited law review article
(Shapiro & Pearse 2012). Over the years, it has often been regarded as one of the most-cited law
review articles not involving constitutional law.
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shatters versus repeat players, repeat players versus one-shatters, one-shatters
versus one-shatters, and repeat players versus repeat players.
Galanter noted that repeat players (often large bureaucratic organizations)
have long-term strategic interests beyond the immediate monetary stakes of an
individual dispute. Specifically, repeat players play the odds in their repetitive
interactions and engagements by settling cases that are likely to produce adverse
precedent and litigating cases that are likely to produce rules that promote their
interests. Factors that influence.party decisions whether to litigate or settle include
assessments of the likelihood of success, the resources available, and the costs of
continuing litigation. By filtering cases in which courts develop law, repeat players secure legal interpretations that favor their interests and impede the ability
for one-shatters to achieve significant social reforms through the legal system.
Galanter's framework is significant because it highlights how unequal resources
and incentives of parties may allow repeat players to control and determine the
content of law. As a result, repeat players are able to influence the content and
meaning of law.
By analyzing situations in which repeat players gain advantages in the legal
system, Galanter set out an important agenda for legal scholars, sociologists, political scientists, and economists interested in examining (1) the law's capacity to
produce social change, (2) the limits of the legal system to achieve redistributive
outcomes, (3) the advantages and disadvantages of alternative and conventional
legal procedures, (4) law and inequality, and (5) the gap between the law on the
books and the law in action. Scholars have been exploring these and other questions for the past forty years in a variety of areas (Glenn 2003; Kritzer & Silbey
2003; Talesh 2013). Let me briefly highlight the multifaceted directions several
generations of scholars and legal actors have taken the article.
Scholars empirically study and analyze the one-shatter v. repeat player framework in relation to courts. In particular, the various structural advantages repeat
players enjoy in the legal system that Galanter emphasizes-namely, greater access
to resources, information, specialists, reduced start-up costs, long-run strategic
interests, and development of informal facilitative relationships with institutional
incumbents-provide a valuable set of variables to explore. Empirical studies demonstrate that repeat·player litigants with substantial organizational resources and
strength are much more likely to win in the federal courts of appeals than one-shot
litigants that have fewer resources (Songer et al. 1999). Another empirical study
demonstrates that litigation resources are much more strongly related to success
in the courts of appeals than in either the United State Supreme Court or state
supreme courts (Songer & Sheehan 1992). With regard to state supreme courts,
stronger parties, especially larger governmental units, achieve an advantage over
weaker parties, though the advantage generally is rather small (Wheeler et al.
1987).

Research generated from Galanter's article is not limited to the United States,
but shapes how scholars examine courts in other countries. For example, Szmer
and colleagues examined the impact of lawyer capability on the decision making
of the Supreme Court of Canada and found that litigation experience and litigation team size influenced Canadian court decision making (Szmer et al. 2007).
A comparative analysis of 14,000 civil cases in the United States and United
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Kingdom across a variety of disputing forums reveals that one important effect
of lawyer representation is increased formality, which sometimes works to disadvantage people who attempt to represent themselves (Sandefur 2005). Studies of
the Philippine Supreme Court (Haynie 1994, 1995; Haynie et al. 2001), the High
Court of Australia (Willis & Sheehan 1999; Smyth 2000), the Court of Appeal of
England and Wales (Atkins 1991), the Indian Supreme Court (Haynie et al. 2001),
the South African Supreme Court (Haynie et al. 2001), and the Tanzanian Court
·of Appeals (Haynie et al. 2001) all examine outcomes under the "party capability
theory" that Galanter set forth years ago. These studies provide general support
for the proposition that in the context of appellate litigation, the "Haves" come out
ahead against weaker parties because they have tangible and intangible resource
advantages.
Party resource advantages, however, need not lie only with private actors.
Other research demonstrates how that advantage lies even more with governments than business parties (Kritzer 2003). Kritzer's study highlights how the
government does not merely have greater resources and experience, but has
a fundamental advantage since it sets the rules by which cases are brought and
decisions are made. Moreover, it is government officials such as judges who make
the decisions. Other empirical studies focus on the pivotal role that lawyers play
among Haves and Have-nots. A randomized experimental evaluation of a legal
assistance program for low-income tenants shows that the provision of legal
counsel produces large differences in outcomes for low-income tenants in housing
court, independent of the merits of the case (Seron et al. 2001). Quite apart from
examining the state of and resource capacity of different litigants, one study demonstrates that lawyers can be viewed as repeat players who affect judicial outcomes
(McGuire 1995). While Galanter's article and its progeny mapped the dilemmas
of judicially created common law rules, others have expanded the analysis to
social reform legislation designed to address a specific social problem or protect
disadvantaged interests (Albiston 1999). Thus, aside from traditional theories of
lobbying, campaign contributions and agency capture, ongoing research using
Galanter's typology over the past forty years reveals how repeat players are able to
influence judicial decisions and social reform legislation.
Scholars also adopt Galanter's framework, however, when studying "courtappended systems," Galanter's term for referring to state and federal courtconnected alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs and private voluntary
or mandatory ADR programs (see Talesh 2013 for summary). Amidst the challenges of using the formal court system to resolve conflicts, internal grievance and
alternative dispute resolution are increasingly the forums for resolving potential
legal disputes (Galanter & Lande 1992; Sutton et al. 1994; Edelman & Suchman
1999; Menkel-Meadow 1999). The increasing privatization of dispute resolution
by organizations is supported and approved by legislatures (Talesh 2009, 2013,
2015) and courts across the United States (Edelman & Talesh 2011). Empirical
studies in these forums that specifically use Galanter's framework focus on variation in complainants' success rates (Hanningan 1977; Bingham 1998; Bingham
and Sarraf 2000; Eisenberg & Hill 2003; Hirsh 2008; Colvin 2011), the influence
of occupational prestige and experience (Kinsey & Stalans 1999; Hirsh 2008), lawyer representation (Bingham 1997), legal resources (Steele 1974; Burstein 1989;
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Bingham 1997; Hirsh 2008) and complaint handlers' decision making (Edelman,
Erlanger & Lande 1993; Gilad 2010).
In addition to analyzing these mechanisms, scholars debate whether outcomes
are better for one-shatters or repeat players in alternative forums. Moreover,
policy debates concerning reforming alternative dispute resolution structures are
often framed using Galanter's framework (Stone 1996; Menkel-Meadow 1999;
Cole 2001; Talesh 2012, 2013). In sum, in addition to using Galanter's framework
when evaluating party interaction with public legal institutions, scholars use his
framework when examining private disputing forums.
But what about in the 21st century? How has the relationship between oneshotters and repeat players changed, if at all, amidst the move toward publicprivate partnerships and the contracting out of rights to private and quasi-private
adjudicatory regimes? Surprisingly, although it is well-established that consumers
and other aggrieved parties such as employees and shareholders are adjudicating
public legal rights through internal grievance and alternative dispute resolution
forums operated by private actors with the blessing of courts and legislatures,
little empirical research addresses how these disputing forums are created, how do
they operate, and in particular, what is the process through which the meaning of
law is constructed through different organizational dispute resolution structures.
Galanter on occasion has urged for more research on these very issues (Galanter
& Lande 1992).
My own work attempts to synthesize these two strands of research that spawned
from Galanter's seminal article concerning repeat player influence among public
and private legal institutions. Rather than examining repeat player influence over
public legal institutions and private dispute resolution structures separately, my
research for the past decade tries to articulate a framework for understanding how
the Haves come out ahead in the 21st century. As the boundaries between public
and private become increasingly blurred, my empirical research suggests that the
Haves create a private legal order, then influence the public legal order, in order to
utilize and maintain a private legal order (Talesh 2009, 2012, 2013).
In response to powerful consumer protection laws aimed at manufacturers
standing behind their warranties issued to consumers, my research shows how
automobile manufacturers first created internal dispute resolution structures to
adjudicate public legal rights outside the judicial process and then ceded control
of these structures to third-party dispute resolution organizations for legitimacy
purposes (Talesh 2009, 2013). The legislature ultimately codified these privatized
adjudicatory systems into law and afforded considerable deference to these quasiprivate and quasi-public regimes. Thus, I demonstrate a connection between the
Haves creating a private disputing regime and influencing public legal institutions
such as courts and legislatures. By analyzing how the quintessential repeat player-organizations-legalize their disputes themselves while also interacting with
legislatures and courts, I offer a unique view into the processes and mechanisms
through which law codified in public legal institutions is flowing from law that
is created among and within organizations. Understanding how organizational
repeat player influence converges in both spaces simultaneously is particularly
important given the tum toward public-private partnerships in society.
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Through participant observation and interviews, I continued my analysis by
comparing how two different alternative dispute resolution forums (one created
and administered by private organizations in California, and the other administered and run by the state of Vermont) operating outside the court system resolve
consumer disputes. Unlike the single-arbitrator system in the private dispute resolution programs, Vermont uses an arbitration board consisting of a five-person
panel of arbitrators (three citizens, an automotive dealer representative, and a
technical expert). I find that the institutional design of dispute resolution, and how
business and consumer values and perspectives are translated by field actors in
different dispute resolution systems, leads to two different meanings of law operating in California and Vermont. Managerial and business values of rationality,
efficiency, and discretion flow into law operating in California's private dispute
resolution structures primarily through an arbitration training and socialization
process conducted by third-party administrators hired by automobile manufacturers to run their lemon law arbitration program (Talesh 2012). The institutional
context socializes arbitrators to ignore consumer emotion and narrows the factfinding role of arbitrators to a passive arbiter reliant on parties to present facts. As
a result, arbitrators are taught to adjudicate cases not in the shadow of the formal
lemon law on the books, but in the shadow of a managerialized lemon law replete
with its own rules, procedures, and construction of law that changes the meaning
of consumer protection. Moreover, as business values flow through the disputing
structure, organizational repeat players gain subtle opportunities for advantages
through the operation of California dispute resolution structures.
Vermont's vastly different dispute resolution system has far less tendency than
the process in California to introduce busirtess values into the meaning and operation of lemon laws. To the extent business values are introduced into the process
by the presence of dealer and technical expert board members, they are balanced
with competing consumer logics by the presence of citizen panel members and a
state administrator. Rather than emphasizing professional training and socialization, Vermont's structure illustrates how participatory representation, an inquisitorial fact-finding approach, and balancing consumer and business perspectives
in the decision-making process can help curb repeat player advantages. In terms
of consumer outcomes in these hearings, consumers do far worse in private than
state-run disputing structures (Talesh 2012).
Thus, my own work builds upon and elaborates Galanter's work and offers
an updated account of the relationship between repeat players and one-shotters
in the 21st century. In a world where private actors are increasingly involved in
handling functions traditionally run by the government, the Haves no longer
simply play for favorable rules in the public arena, but rather play for removing
the entire disputing game from the public arena into the private arena, actively
create the terms of legal compliance, and reshape the meaning of consumer rights
and remedies. This is a critical and as yet unrecognized way in which the Haves
come out ahead. However, contrary to most studies that demonstrate how repeat
players gain advantages in disputing structures, my comparative research design
also allows me to explore how dispute resolution structures can also inhibit repeat
player advantages. Simply stated, the institutional design can facilitate and inhibit
repeat player advantages.
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Galanter's article did not just provide us with a typology and vocabulary
that has become part of the lexicon of law, it set forth a wide-reaching research
agenda that has shaped the thinking of scholars and policymakers. More research
is needed to explore how different dispute resolution systems with varying degrees
of business and state involvement operate on the ground and interpret and implement law. If studies building upon Galanter's work have shown us anything, it
is that there is great variation in when, whether, and how the Haves come out
ahead. While much work has been done, scholars should continue to learn more
about what is happening on the ground when Haves and Have-nots interact in
legal settings.
In addition to spurring several decades of exciting and important research,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead has achieved canonical stature within college
and university courses. I had the pleasure of being assigned the article as part of my
undergraduate coursework, in law school, and during my doctoral studies. Having
moved into academia, I now assign the article to my first-year law students every
year when I teach Procedural Analysis. 2 Why? In most procedure courses, students
learn the language, structure, and interpretation of the complex rules governing
the operation of the American federal civil justice system. Students analyze cases
and problems concerning when, where, and whether to bring a lawsuit, against
whom to bring the action, and what procedural options are available to respond
strategically to the changing circumstances as the lawsuit proceeds. At its core,
the course is concerned with the lawyer's vast array of procedural options and
maneuvers in bringing or defending a lawsuit. Certain themes generally prevail
throughout a procedure course, including how should procedural systems balance
justice and efficiency, what does procedural fairness mean in different contexts,
and how does procedural fairness impact substantive fairness.
I assign Galanter's article because it succinctly conveys what procedure professors have emphasized to students for decades: procedure is not merely about
"the rules," but rather how the rules are used and mobilized by the players in the
litigation game. To the extent procedure affects and at times even trumps substantive fairness, Galanter's article provides a wonderful lens into how this occurs.
Galanter does this by explaining how the actors who use the litigation system vary
in resources and power. While procedure professors take a semester to unpack
the distinction between procedure and substance, Galanter unpacks this issue in a
few pages by highlighting the advantages that repeat players maintain in the civil
litigation system. These repeat player advantages include but are not limited to (1)
advanced intelligence and the ability to preplan transactions, (2) ongoing access to
specialists and lawyers, reduced start-up costs and economies of scale, (3) informal
facilitative relationships with institutional actors, (4) long-run strategic interests
and the ability to play for favorable rules, and (5) experience in discerning which
rule-changes are likely to "penetrate" into the law in action.
While Galanter's focus is on the configuration of power and the systematic
structural advantages and disadvantages in litigation, the article does not offer a
class or power elite analysis. He does not conclude that members of the dominant
class or large wealthy organizations always win in litigation. Rather, he focuses
2

UC Irvine's version of Civil Procedure is called Procedural Analysis.
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on the way that the litigation system-and the procedural rules within it-create
structural advantages for repeat players. In sum, I believe every law and legal
studies student should be required to read his article because it contextualizes the
procedural system as something more than a set of rules that should be memorized
and mechanically applied. Galanter's gift is that his article reflects a sophisticated
set of ideas, yet he still manages to convey the ideas in simple ways. Consequently,
students benefit from reading this article because it illuminates how efficiency,
justice, equality, and procedural and substantive fairness impact litigants in real
and tangible ways. The article captures the real and lived experience of those who
encounter law in society, and provides context for talking about rules that are too
often thought of as "given" to society by formal legal institutions.
As we celebrate the 4oth anniversary of this article, I do not think anyonescholars, students, policymakers, judges, or individual citizens-can credibly dispute that this article continues to impact those who interact with the law. I hope
that those interested in understanding the social and political dynamics of the law
and law's capacity to produce social change will continue to draw from one of the
most influential pieces of legal scholarship ever written. I certainly will.
SHAUHIN A. TALESH

Assistant Professor of Law,
Sociology, and
Criminology, Law & Society
University of California, Irvine
School of Law
Irvine, California
May, 2014
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